have passed since this article was
published, and the effort to entirely re-write the attorney’s lien statute has yet
to catch on generally.
The second article is a student note
by a Seattle University School of Law
student in 2004.6 Zach Elsner raises
many of the same criticisms discussed
in this article and he concludes that
“the Washington Attorney Lien Statute is now limited in ways that prevent
it from serving its purposes.” He has
urged that the lien statute be amended
to alleviate some of the criticisms. 7 No
one has yet taken him up on his suggestion. A third article addressed the
impact of the 2004 amendments on the
so-called Blaney cases. 8
Professor Marjorie Rombauer, University of Washington School of Law
faculty, has written Volumes 27 and 28
of the Washington Practice series on
Creditor’s Rights and Debtor’s Reme-dies. She has a chapter on the attorney’s
lien statute, where she politely points
out some of the statute’s shortcomings.
Shortcomings of the Statute
When is notice required? While notices of claims of lien filed with the clerk
are commonly used by lawyers, some
parts of the statute require notice and
other parts do not. The statute fails to
provide any guidance on the matter
of notice. The statute should spell out
when notice is essential to the “
perfection” of the lien as to third parties.
What must the notice of lien contain,
and to whom? Nothing in the statute
spells out what a required notice of
claim of lien must contain other than
the inadequate provisions in RCW
60. 40.010( 1)(e) relating solely to liens
on judgments. Nowhere in the statute
will one find who must receive notice.
The statute is silent on the consequences of failing to give adequate notice.
Attorney’s lien on an “action.” The ex-
isting statute states that an attorney has
a lien on “an action, including one pur-
sued by arbitration or mediation,” and
that this lien exists as a matter of law.
No requirement of notice of this lien is
contained in the statute, as amended in
2004.9 However, the statute makes no
provision for the situation where a law-
yer is entitled to an attorney’s lien by
operation of law but where a stakehold-
er, not having received notice of the
lien, disburses the secured recovery in
derogation of the lawyer’s lien. Is any
stakeholder where an action is pending
deemed constructively on notice of a
lien in an indeterminate amount? Who
bears that loss? The statute as amended
in 2004 is silent on this.
Lien terminology and jurisprudence.
Other lien statutes and their jurispru-
dence typically use terms like vested,
perfected, attaches, priority, and
foreclosure. None of these terms ap-
pear in RCW Chapter 60. 40, although
some case law interpreting this stat-
ute uses some of these terms. The
attorney’s lien statute as redrafted
should clarify whether these concepts
are part of the statute and the statute
should contain definitions so the sub-
sequent sections of the new statute
are clearly understood.
Priority of liens. The existing statute is
not as clear as it could be as to priorities
between competing liens, and under
what circumstances an attorney’s lien
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www.williamskastner.com
AREAS OF PRACTICE
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
SCHOOL LAW
BUSINESS LITIGATION
JON R. MORRONE
206.233.2974
jmorrone@williamkastner.com
through Seattle University School of Law’s
South African Law, Policy, and History:
Apartheid, Democracy, and the Future
May 26 -31, 2014, Johannesburg, South Africa
In addition to lectures from academics, practitioners,
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“This CLE was invaluable in my professional development
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Earn CLE credits in South Africa
For more information, contact
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